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Abstract. Complying with security and privacy requirements of appliances 
such as mobile handsets, personal computers, servers for customers, enterprises 
and governments is mandatory to prevent from theft of sensitive data and to 
preserve their integrity. Nowadays, with the rising of the Cloud Computing 
approach in business fields, security and privacy are even more critical. The 
aim of this article is then to propose a way to build a secure and trustable Cloud. 
The idea is to spread and embed Secure Elements (SE) on each level of the 
Cloud in order to make a wide trusted infrastructure which complies with 
access control and isolation policies. This article presents therefore this new 
approach of trusted Cloud infrastructure based on a Network of Secure 
Elements (NoSE), and it illustrates this approach through different use cases.   
1 Introduction 
Cloud Computing is revolutionizing the delivery of information services as it offers 
several advantages over traditional IT systems mainly in terms of cost-reduction and 
agility. However, it raises many concerns related to security and privacy which are 
main obstacles for its large adoption [4].  
Moreover, the current situation of Cloud Computing is dominated by the model 
where the Cloud Service Provider (CSP) defines his terms/conditions and each Cloud 
User (CU) has to accept them and trust the CSP. Unfortunately, several recent cases 
of security or privacy breaches [5] showed that CUs should (i) pay attention to how 
CSPs effectively manage security and privacy within their infrastructures and (ii) be 
154 S. Betgé-Brezetz et al. 
 
part of this management. This point is underlined by key standard [6] or regulation 
bodies notably in Europe [7]. Indeed, under the EU laws, the CU remains responsible 
for the collection and processing of sensitive data, even when third parties (i.e., CSP) 
process these data. Although he has currently no regulatory responsibility, the CSP 
has however to comply with the contractual obligations required by the CU and 
therefore has to provide the CU with the necessary features and technologies allowing 
the protection of the CU sensitive data within his Cloud infrastructure. 
Several works are then tackling these Cloud privacy and security issues. Regarding 
data protection, we can mention the Data Protection as a Service approach [1] or 
platforms for Cloud privacy management [2]. However, these approaches do not 
really allow defining a large range of privacy policies and the data privacy protection 
mechanism needs also to be securely executed so that it should not be corrupted. 
Regarding the protection of software execution, the use of Secure Elements (SE) is a 
common solution. A SE can be for example a Trusted Platform Module (TPM) with a 
secure crypto-processor providing secure storage for cryptographic keys and which 
can also be used to verify the validity of the software running on a computer [12]. 
Similarly, Hardware Security Module (HSM), a special type of secure crypto-
processor has been used to manage digital keys, and to provide strong authentication 
to access critical keys for server applications [13]. Several research projects [14] have 
been launched to define new ways to grow trust in the cloud but not by directly 
embedding SE (e.g., A4Cloud, TClouds) or using SE (e.g., TECOM) but not tackling 
how they can build together a cloud Trusted Computing Base. 
The European CELTIC+/Seed4C project (Secure Embedded Element and Data 
privacy for Cloud) [16], presented in this paper, aims to address these key challenges 
of Cloud security and privacy management. In this Seed4C project, we propose a new 
approach of cooperative Secure Elements (or “Seeds”) allowing the trusted 
enforcement of a wide range of policy in order to ensure the security properties 
(confidentiality, integrity, availability) and to protect the privacy of user sensitive 
data. In order to achieve this, Seed4C aims to tackle various questions and technical 
challenges such as: What are the critical functions to be supported by these SEs? How 
to distribute SEs in the infrastructure and provide added value to platform and 
services? How to address communication between SEs and from SEs to embedding 
machines? The project is then proposing a technology able to address these challenges 
and that will be further carried out in use-cases of different domains. 
This paper is then structured as follows. In Section 2, we explain the key principles 
of the Seed4C approach and how it can grow trust for Cloud infrastructures. In 
Section 3, we illustrate this approach through two examples of use cases respectively 
in the domains of high performance computing and privacy policy enforcement. 
Finally, in the conclusion, we discuss the next stages of our work. 
2 Seed4C Approach: The NoSE as a Minimal Trusted 
Computing Base for the Cloud 
The Network of Secure Elements (NoSE) is the cornerstone of the Seed4C project. 
NoSE is then a network of interconnected Secure Elements defining, for the Cloud, a 
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minimal Trusted Computing Base (TCB) (i.e., a minimum set of hardware, firmware, 
and/or software components necessary for security) [11].  
 
Fig. 1. Seed4C approach based on a Network of Secure Elements (“seeds”) deployed within the 
Cloud infrastructure and offering trustable security and data protection  
Secure Elements (SEs) are software or hardware elements that are usually 
connected locally with/in pieces of equipment. They do not communicate apart with 
some management services through a dedicated and controlled channel on the overall 
system or infrastructure. As said, SEs are by definition and construction elements that 
do not communicate or in a very controlled way. Making them communicate and 
collaborate to build a Network of Secure Elements that can secure an entire Cloud 
based infrastructure is indeed a research challenge. 
In the Seed4C project, we will introduce deployment and configuration ability at 
the architecture level. With the NoSE, each Secure Element represents locally the 
minimal TCB to implement security function and the interconnection of SE makes the 
minimal TCB for a trusted service on a Cloud infrastructure. The trusted Cloud 
Computing Base allows connecting different parts of the infrastructure from the 
access and transport network until the Cloud nodes. 
The NoSE allows end-to-end virtual security chain from the user terminal to the 
high-end server where the services are executed or to the place where data are 
processed and stored (see Figure 1). One important aspect of the NoSE is proximity. 
For this purpose, different options of embedment of Secure Element within the Cloud 
infrastructure will be considered (e.g., SE embedded in a physical Cloud node or rack, 
SE connected to a node hypervisor, or even software SE embedded in a Virtual 
Machine). Moreover, as a NoSE is composed of several elements, we can easily 
envisage that the NoSE will scale accordingly to the Cloud infrastructure or network. 
Its proximity to the running Virtual Machine or virtualized execution environment 
will allow correctly checking the environment and giving high assurance. The SE as 
element of the NoSE will be managed during the equipment lifecycle, for the physical 
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provisioning part, but will be loaded/unloaded of some critical assets (credentials, 
attributes, etc) through the NoSE protocols. The SE will be accessed by local 
middleware/services during the life of a service from designing, provisioning & 
decommissioning of their components. The NoSE independence will provide a 
separate channel of trust. The policies / security rules will be executed by the different 
components of the architecture and the SE will contribute to that execution. SEs will 
communicate inside the NoSE using a secure channel such as the one specified by the 
ETSI Technical Committee Smart Card Platform [15]. 
As a first result of the project we will rely on a security language [9] in order to 
provide a canvas of easy to instantiate security properties. The application developers 
will be able to use these high level security properties. Through a specific compiler, 
the security properties will be translated into security policies for the different 
protection mechanisms at each level of the Cloud. These policies will be transferred 
through the NoSE to each local enforcement point. The policies will be then enforced 
by a set of reference monitors such as SE Linux and PIGA [9]. These reference 
monitors, embedded in SE and linked each other, will collaborate through the NoSE. 
Evidences of enforcement will finally be sent back to the CU thanks to the NoSE. 
3 Examples of Addressed Use-Cases 
3.1 High Performance Computing 
When one spokes about High Performance Computing (HPC) one thinks about 
clusters and grids. Nevertheless since few years Cloud Computing offers services for 
scientists who need high performance computing facilities for their researches. Such 
intensive computing can use very sensitive data notably in domains as eHealth.  
For ensuring the adequate data projection on the computing infrastructure, the 
software (middleware) which is in charge of communications between scientists and 
services is then critical. We will use the SOA based middleware DIET developed at 
ENS Lyon [8]. The principles of DIET are simple and the programming model is 
based on the GridRPC paradigm. A user sends a request to DIET to know whether a 
service is available on the platform. If this service exists, he sends the data needed by 
the service without carrying about where it is located, and finally obtains the results. 
Recent developments on the DIET middleware stretch to make it compatible with 
some CSPs like EC2, Eucalyptus, Nimbus, OpenStack, OpenNebula, etc. 
Furthermore, DIET was not originally designed to address security problems as 
confidentiality and integrity. We propose therefore a proof of concept to add security 
skill to this middleware by leveraging the SE capabilities so that the computation on 
sensitive data will only be assigned to a trusted node having the adequate security 
protection. For instance a DIET user in an aerospace company wants to compute a 
model of an airplane and he does not want the rival companies to know what he does. 
So his requests and data sent must be confidential (confidentiality) and not allow 
unauthorized modifications (integrity). Thanks to the SEs embedded both in 1) the 
servers’ daemons which provide services and 2) virtual machines instantiated by these 
servers, security properties are guaranteed. 
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3.2 Privacy Policy Enforcement 
Another domain that will benefit from the NoSE approach of Seed4C is privacy. 
Indeed, in the Cloud context, as the CU outsources sensitive data (end-users personal 
information or enterprise documents such as HR documents on employees, bids, 
tenders, patents, etc.) to the CSP, the CU should be able to specify some requirements 
related to access control, data location, retention management, data usage/motion 
tracking, etc., governing how his data and the related processing must be protected 
within the Cloud infrastructure of the CSP. Moreover, in order to strengthen the trust 
between both parties, the CSP must be able not only to enforce the CU data protection 
requirements all along the data lifecycle but also to prove this enforcement. 
For this purpose, we have proposed an approach of multilevel privacy policy 
enforcement [3] which consists for the CU to express his privacy and data protection 
requirements as policies applicable at several levels. One can distinguish for instance 
the Application-Level that includes policies governing the end-user or application 
level actions on CU data and the Infrastructure-Level that includes policies governing 
the CSP components (e.g. storage system, file system) actions on CU data.  
In this multilevel policy context, the NoSE concept will be a real chain of trust 
between the CU and the CSP. Each Policy Enforcement Point either controlled by the 
CU (Application-Level Policy Enforcement) or by the CSP (Infrastructure-Level 
Policy Enforcement) could be executed within or in cooperation with a Secure 
Element that can among other provide certified information as needed, evaluate 
policies and generate the tamper-proof traces that can help to prove the fulfillment of 
the CU data protection requirements.  
4 Conclusion 
The distributed and dynamic nature of Cloud infrastructures requires thinking 
differently on how security and assurance are brought to execution elements. The 
Seed4C project, presented in this article, proposes a new approach called the NoSE 
(Network of Secure Element). The NoSE can be beneficial in several ways, bringing 
trust from the infrastructure layer up to the service and application ones. 
At this stage, several use-cases have been identified and it is being elaborated the 
architecture and the abstract model to express policies. The next step is to define how 
to distribute policies to the NoSE and how the NoSE exchanges information, validates 
policies, indicates compliance and provides assurance. Moreover, the project has also 
planned to validate the Seed4C platform using real and large scale distributed 
infrastructures such as Grid’5000 [10] which can be used to deploy our own Cloud 
infrastructure with a NoSE. Also different exploitation models will be studied, from 
the cloud infrastructure operators that control the NoSE up to Over-The-Top scenarios 
that benefit from the NoSE at lower layers. 
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